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drug courts, they are designed to divert certain individuals with
mental illnesses into treatment while consolidating their cases
before designated “mental health court” judges.  These courts are
one response to the prevalence of mental disorders among defen-
dants, which creates a burden that “threatens to overwhelm the
criminal justice system.”5 In its Criminal Justice/Mental Health
Consensus Project, the Council of State Governments recognized
mental health courts as one of several “workable options” that
communities with limited resources have developed to better fit
the system to the needs of these defendants.6 The first mental
health court of this era was created in Broward County, Florida,
in 1997.7 Today it is estimated that there are approximately 80
mental health courts of various types throughout the United
States.8 While at this point it is difficult to characterize the “typ-
ical” mental health court,9 most mental health courts appear to
have a consolidated docket of cases involving mental illness,
operate under a judge specially assigned to that docket, and
attempt to divert defendants into treatment and other services.  It
appears that mental health courts are in a state of flux, with more
recently created courts willing to take jurisdiction over some
felony cases.  This is in contrast to the “first generation” of courts
that tended to limit jurisdiction to misdemeanors.10
Both drug courts and mental health courts are based on the
theory of “therapeutic jurisprudence.”  This theory assumes that
legal principles and processes should be examined for their ther-
apeutic or non-therapeutic effect on individuals.11 Advocates for
therapeutic jurisprudence generally assume that traditional
adversarial court processes create impediments to achieving
therapeutic outcomes for defendants.  As a result, drug courts
and mental health courts are usually less formal than traditional
criminal court, with judges and lawyers committed to finding the
best outcome for the defendant in concert with other parties in
the community, including social service and treatment agencies.
One of the most important developments in American lawover the last decade has been the exponential growth ofproblem-solving courts.  Such courts achieve efficiencies
by consolidating certain types of cases before specially designated
judges.  Additionally, in many instances, problem-solving courts
adopt a therapeutic focus  by attempting to achieve outcomes
(e.g., obtaining treatment for a defendant) that go beyond the tra-
ditional goals of the judicial system. A recent commentary in this
journal noted that “problem-solving courts generally focus on the
underlying chronic behaviors of criminal defendants.”1 These
courts include, but are not limited to drug courts, mental health
courts, domestic violence courts, and teen smoking cessation
courts.  Perhaps the first prototypical problem-solving court was
the juvenile court. Today, problem-solving courts exist in many
countries throughout the world.2
Typically, problem-solving courts are designed to respond to
larger social problems that impinge on the justice system.  Drug
courts and mental health courts in particular have emerged
because of the disproportionately high prevalence of substance
use and mental health disorders among criminal defendants.3 As
judicial caseloads and correctional populations swelled with indi-
viduals charged with drug offenses, some judges and court
administrators concluded that at least some defendants would be
better served by treatment programs than incarceration.  In addi-
tion, it was assumed that the creation of special courts would take
pressure off other courts by removing certain types of cases (e.g.
typical first-time, nonviolent drug offenders in drug court cases)
from their dockets. As a result, drug courts were created: the first
in Dade County, Florida, in 1989. Such courts proved immensely
popular.  Today there are more than 1,200 drug courts in exis-
tence or in planning, and more than 226,000 defendants have
participated in drug-court-related programs.4
Mental health courts have been created more recently.  Like
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Drug courts are now assumed by most to accomplish their goal
of obtaining treatment for defendants, and preliminary research
suggests that mental health courts also may serve as an effective
gateway to treatment services.12
The development of problem-solving courts is sufficiently
advanced that discussions have begun about how to spread the
principles that underlie them more broadly through the legal sys-
tem.13 These discussions are occurring simultaneously with dis-
cussion about the changing role of trial judges, which has been
hastened in part by the creation of problem-solving courts.14
Although these developments within the judiciary have occa-
sioned healthy debate about their implications for the courts, the
impact on other parties has received less notice.  Drug courts and
mental health courts may indeed facilitate access to treatment for
defendants, and even influence the success of treatment through
continued monitoring and the use of sanctions for noncompli-
ance.15 However, the courts by necessity depend on others,
including social service agencies, treatment providers, and pro-
bation officers, to implement the mandate to participate in treat-
ment.  Like the courts, these parties have been influenced by
broader social phenomena and have adopted strategies to cope
with the demands of maximizing dwindling resources to serve
and supervise a growing high-risk population. 
One particularly promising strategy is the development of
specialty caseloads for probationers with mental illness (here-
after, PMI).  Probation officers with specialty caseloads play a
central role in monitoring and enforcing the conditions of pro-
bation, including the mandate to participate in treatment.  Thus,
these officers combine two functions: they seek to assure public
safety (the traditional probation officer role), but also attempt to
assure the rehabilitation of the probationer (a therapeutic role).
Although such specialty agencies emerged at least two decades
ago, nearly half have been created over the past five years, mir-
roring the growth of problem-solving courts.16 In the rest of this
article, we describe the demands on probation officers of super-
vising PMIs, the unique response of specialty probation agencies
to these demands, and the relation between these agencies and
the courts.  In doing so, we draw on recently conducted research
that elicited the views of probation supervisors, probation offi-
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cers, and probationers with
mental illnesses regarding the
management of PMIs. We con-
clude with a summary of issues
that must be addressed if spe-
cialty agencies for PMIs are to
continue growing and succeed. 
I. THE UNIQUE DEMANDS
OF SUPERVISING 
PROBATIONERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS
In 2002, nearly four million probationers were supervised in
the community, easily making probation the prototypic correc-
tional disposition.17 Although no methodologically sound esti-
mate of the national prevalence of mental disorder among pro-
bationers is available,18 the results of a self-report survey sug-
gests that over one-half million (16%) of these probationers suf-
fered some form of mental illness.19 For the typical officer car-
rying a caseload of 125 probationers, then, facing the unique
demands of probationers with serious mental illness is an
inescapable fact of practice.
These demands were described in two studies conducted by
one of the authors (JS):  one study involved a series of focus
groups with PMIs and with their specialty and general probation
officers in three major cities (Phoenix, Philadelphia, and Las
Vegas, N= 52);20 the other was a national survey of specialty and
traditional probation agency supervisors (N=91).21 These stud-
ies suggest that probationers with mental illnesses create four
significant demands beyond traditional probationers.  First,
PMIs often have pronounced needs for treatment and other
social services (e.g., housing, SSI).  These services not only fall
outside the range of officers’ ordinary practice, but also are diffi-
cult to access from underfunded and overburdened treatment
and social service systems.  Second, some PMIs’ functional abil-
ities are limited, such that they are unable to follow the basic
conditions of probation (e.g., working, paying fees, reporting to
their officer’s office), let alone navigate the complex social ser-
vice system.  Third, probation officers are expected to monitor
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is the development
of specialty 
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probationers with
mental illness.
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and enforce PMIs’ compli-
ance with the general con-
ditions of probation as well
as special conditions of
treatment participation.22
Although probation person-
nel assume that treatment
compliance is essential to
successfully maintaining a
PMI in the community,23
the probationer’s complex
service needs render it rela-
tively difficult and time consuming for an officer to monitor and
assure compliance.24 Fourth, PMIs often have substance abuse
problems.  For probationers with both a mental illness and a
substance abuse disorder, the two problems can interact with
and exacerbate one another, rendering drug abstinence and
treatment response less likely.25
Probation officers may find these demands formidable, par-
ticularly while juggling a caseload of 125 or more probationers.
This context lends credibility to the widespread perception that
PMIs are at relatively high risk for probation violation and crim-
inal recidivism.26
II.  MEETING THE DEMANDS: SPECIALTY CASELOADS
One response to these demands has been the creation of spe-
cialty probation caseloads designed exclusively for those with
mental illness.  Given the complexities of supervising PMIs, the
Council of State Governments, in its Criminal Justice/Mental
Health Consensus Project, recommends explicitly the creation of
such specialty caseloads.27
Probation agencies have a relatively long history of creating
specialty caseloads for individuals perceived as having more
complex needs than other probationers.  For example, special
caseloads or conditions of probation have been created for sex
offenders,28 domestic violence offenders, drug offenders, gang
offenders, youthful offenders, Spanish-speaking offenders, and
the like.29 Other relevant examples include the imposition of
special conditions for individuals found “guilty but mentally
ill,”30 and for juveniles under the jurisdiction of a juvenile men-
tal health court.31 Several jurisdictions use drug offender pro-
bation, often in conjunction with drug courts, and evidence sug-
gests that properly designed probation programs can reduce
recidivism and drug use.32
Like mental health courts and drug courts, mental health
probation has emerged as part of a larger movement in the crim-
inal justice system toward specialization and problem-solving
for defendants with needs that do not respond to traditional
approaches.  A recent survey of probation agencies in the U.S.
suggests that today nearly 100 probation agencies have adopted
specialty caseloads for PMIs, with 66 specialty agencies having
more than one exclusive mental health caseload.33 This survey
compared the 66 specialty agencies with more than one mental
health caseload with a sample of 25 traditional agencies matched
by population size and geographic region.  These survey results,
combined with other work,34 suggest that the prototypic spe-
cialty agency is unique in structure and function in four impor-
tant respects:  caseload structure, case management approach,
the relationship between probation officers and probationers,
and the use of problem-solving strategies when conditions of
probation are violated.  Each is discussed in turn below.  
A.  CASELOAD STRUCTURE
The foundation of the prototypic specialty probation agency
consists of caseloads that are composed exclusively of PMIs, lim-
ited in size, and assigned to interested and specially trained pro-
bation officers.  These caseloads’ most distinctive and perhaps
most important feature is their reduced size.  Average caseload
sizes for officers in specialty agencies (N=40) are less than one-
third that of officers in traditional agencies (N=130).35 In some
agencies, mental health caseloads are considered “high risk”
caseloads in need of intensive supervision, with appropriate
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caseload caps set by agency policy.  
Reduced caseloads are responsive to all four of the demands
associated with supervising PMIs described earlier.  Individuals
with serious mental illnesses typically require substantially more
time from the probation officer than other individuals.  While
this may not be true in every case, in general, a probation officer
must exert sustained effort to implement both the general con-
ditions of probation and special conditions that mandate treat-
ment, especially with probationers who have serious mental
health and substance abuse problems, and who need treatment
and other social services that may be difficult to access and lim-
ited in capacity. Given these difficulties and their impact on the
time an officer must spend on the case of an individual proba-
tioner, it is presumptively appealing to assign smaller caseloads
to expert officers who carry these probationers exclusively.  In
traditional agencies, PMIs may be perceived as atypical “prob-
lems to the system” that drain resources from other cases.
Reduced mental health caseloads provide officers with the time
to develop and implement difficult social service referrals, han-
dle crises, and intensively supervise these high risk individuals.
As specialty officers gain experience, training, and connections
with the social welfare systems, PMIs are transformed from
“problems to the system” to routine cases with an array of work-
able options.  As explained below, however, maintaining smaller
specialized and exclusive mental health caseloads in the face of
pressing demand for probation services is one of the most sig-
nificant challenges facing the legal system today. 
B.  CASE MANAGEMENT APPROACH
Mental health caseloads, the foundation of the prototypic
specialty mental health agency, are associated with a unique case
management approach.  First, as suggested earlier, these case-
loads create important administrative efficiencies.  Unlike tradi-
tional agencies, where officers attempt to find a way to fit round
PMIs into a square supervision system on a case-by-case basis,
officers in specialty agencies follow or develop routines and pro-
cedures tailored to the PMI.  For example, specialty agencies
often apply explicit definitions to determine which probationers
are eligible for specialty supervision, and impose special condi-
tions by which these probationers must abide.  Although refer-
ral processes and eligibility criteria may vary from agency to
agency, probationers must be mentally ill to be assigned to the
prototypic specialty agency.  Broward County, Florida, provides
an example of how eligibility for mental health probation may
be defined. The administrative order establishing mental health
probation provides that “if deemed appropriate by the presiding
Judge and otherwise permitted by law, and with the specific
agreement and consent of the defendants themselves, defen-
dants suffering from mental illness or mental retardation, as
diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert, may be sentenced
to a probationary period entitled ‘Mental Health Probation’ to be
supervised by specially designated Probation Officers within the
Department of Corrections.”36 Additionally, a defendant placed
on mental health proba-
tion in Broward County
may be required to comply
with some or all of the fol-
lowing conditions:
• Sign an authorization
for release of all med-
ical and psychological
records as deemed nec-
essary for the treatment
of mental illness and/or
supervision by the Department of Corrections (in Florida,
the State Department of Corrections oversees probation);
• Comply with a treatment plan approved by the court;
• Enter and actively participate in inpatient mental health
and/or drug and alcohol treatment or other facility deemed
appropriate by the Probation Officer; 
• Enter and actively participate in outpatient treatment as
deemed appropriate by the Probation Officer; 
• Submit to random drug and/or alcohol testing;
• Take all medications prescribed for the treatment of mental
illness;
• Not operate a motor vehicle;
• Submit to a mandatory curfew;
• Have no contact with the victim, directly or indirectly, unless
approved by the victim, therapist and sentencing court;
• Be responsible for payment for programs and services if
financially able.
Second, in addition to creating administrative efficiencies, the
prototypic specialty agency’s case management approach inte-
grates internal (probation) and external (community) resources
to meet the PMIs’ needs.  The specialty officer is not merely an
agent who “refers out” and then monitors compliance with the
conditions of probation.  This officer also uses his or her
acquired skills and relationships with treatment providers and
other social service agencies to help address the PMIs’ needs.
Specialty officers typically work closely with treatment providers
as part of a team.  They attend team meetings, help secure social
resources, and generally form connections with agencies that
facilitate efficient work with PMIs.
These close working relationships are crucial because proba-
tion officers oversee compliance with treatment typically pro-
vided by other entities.  Thus, communication with providers is
essential for monitoring and ensuring treatment compliance.
The nature of close provider-officer relationships, however, is
critical.  Close collaboration between treatment providers and
officers relates to low rates of probation violation—if the
provider does not merely become an extension of the oversight
role provided by the officer.37 When case managers become an
“extra pair of eyes” for officers, however, probationers are much
more likely to be threatened by their officer with incarceration
for noncompliance.38
36. Broward County, Florida, Admin. Order No. III-02-N-1A, In Re:
Order Concerning Creation of the Mental Health Probation
Program Within the Circuit Court Criminal Division (17th Cir.
Jan. 9, 2002).
37. Roskes & Feldman, supra note 34. 
38. Jeffrey Draine & Phyllis Solomon, The Use of Threats of
Incarceration in a Psychiatric Probation and Parole Service, 71
AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 262 (2001). 
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45. Charles Lidz, Steven Hoge, William Gardner, Nancy Bennett,
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Perceived Coercion and Procedural Justice in the Broward County
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C. RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE
PROBATION OFFICER AND
THE PROBATIONER 
In addition to close collabo-
ration with treatment providers
to meet PMIs’ needs, the proto-
typic specialty officer typically
has a different view of his or
her role and relationship with
the PMI than the traditional
officer.  First, traditional proba-
tion officers tend to emphasize public safety (“control”) as the
primary goal of probation, whereas specialty officers tended to
emphasize meeting the rehabilitative needs of probationers
(“care”) as well.39 These two roles are not completely at odds.
For example, specialty officers may assume that treatment and
rehabilitation lead to more independent functioning on the part
of the probationer: as the probationer becomes more stable and
assumes responsibility for his or her conduct, he or she pre-
sumably becomes less likely to engage in antisocial conduct.
Public safety may be particularly enhanced when the now-
treated mental illness played a causative role in the proba-
tioner’s prior criminal behavior.40
Second, in the focus groups conducted with officers and pro-
bationers, specialty probation officers with mental health case-
loads defined their relationships with probationers differently
than traditional officers in three ways.41 First, specialty officers
reported adopting a more friendly, less authoritarian relation-
ship with probationers than traditional officers; probationers in
turn tended to characterize their relationships with specialty
officers as more caring, supportive, and flexible. Second, main-
tenance of such a relationship was perceived as being less con-
tingent on good behavior and compliance than was the case
with more traditional probation officers. Third, specialty offi-
cers were more concerned with establishing boundaries in their
relationship with probationers in order to maintain a distinc-
tion between the support offered as part of the professional rela-
tionship (which was permissible) and friendship (which was
not).  This is not dissimilar to the boundaries that therapists
establish with patients for ethical reasons.  
Given this, the quality of relationships between officers and
probationers may be defined by two related constructs:  an
alliance (bond, partnership, and confident commitment) and a
“firm but fair” approach (clarity and voice, considerate respect,
and flexible consistency).42 The preliminary research described
above suggests that relationships in specialty agencies may more
often be characterized by a strong alliance and fairness than
those in traditional agencies.  These differences in relationships
contribute significantly to a fourth unique feature of specialty
agencies: officers’ strategies for implementing the conditions of
probation, especially mandated treatment.
D. PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGIES AS A RESPONSE TO
VIOLATIONS
A traditional response to violation of conditions of proba-
tion is the imposition of sanctions, for example, threatening to
revoke or revoking probation.  In contrast, it appears that
problem-solving is the hallmark strategy of specialty officers
for addressing probationer noncompliance, with sanctions
generally used only if other strategies failed.43 In both the
focus group and survey studies described earlier, specialty offi-
cers were much more likely than traditional officers to respond
to a PMI who was noncompliant with treatment by talking
with him or her to identify any obstacles to compliance (e.g.,
he or she might prefer a different medication than the one pre-
scribed), resolving these problems, and agreeing on a compli-
ance plan.   The officer would often include the probationer’s
treatment provider in this discussion.  In contrast, officers in
traditional agencies were significantly more likely than spe-
cialty officers to respond to noncompliance by reminding the
probationer of the rules or by threatening to pursue incarcera-
tion if the probationer continued to disobey.  In short, tradi-
tional officers tended to respond to noncompliance with
threats of sanctions and pursuit of sanctions, whereas specialty
officers called on a more varied set of strategies and used a
more graduated approach before pursuing revocation as
“absolutely the last resort.” 44
The effect of problem-solving and other enforcement strate-
gies on PMIs’ treatment adherence and outcomes compared to
the use of sanctions such as probation revocation is unclear.
However, probationers and many probation officers in focus
groups viewed problem-solving approaches as more effective
than threats in securing compliance.  Probationers appreciated
that their officers would have “fair conversations” with them
about noncompliance, be reasonable in accommodating legiti-
mate problems with adherence, and be open and honest about
potential consequences.  This sentiment is consistent with
research on procedural justice, which suggests that individuals
feel less coerced when they are treated with respect and allowed
to state their views.45 In contrast, probationers believed that
threats often created fear and avoidance, or alternatively, anger
12 Court Review - Winter 2004
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and further noncompliance (“the more they threaten you, the
less a person will do”).46
In summary, the prototypic specialty agency is unique in (a)
its caseload structure (exclusive, reduced mental health case-
loads managed by “expert” officers), (b) its case management
approach (creation of administrative efficiencies and integration
of internal and external resources to meet PMIs’ needs), (c) the
roles of probation officers (emphasizing  “care” as well as “con-
trol”) and their relationships with probationers (strong alliances
and a “firm but fair” approach), and (d) officers’ use of problem-
solving strategies to address probationer noncompliance.
Notably, the prototypic specialty agency defines a category with
indistinct boundaries:  some specialty agencies share few fea-
tures with the prototype, and thus are more similar to traditional
agencies (and vice versa).  Several features prototypic to spe-
cialty agencies parallel features of problem-solving courts.  In
the next section, we describe these parallels and address issues
associated with linking specialty probation with mental health
courts.
III. SPECIALTY MENTAL HEALTH PROBATION 
CASELOADS AND PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS  
Both specialty mental health probation and mental health and
drug courts are confronting issues in the delineation of appro-
priate relationships with clients and in the use of sanctions for
noncompliance with treatment conditions. First, both specialty
probation agencies and problem-solving courts work with
clients who are required to attend treatment.  Specialty officers
and judges alike may struggle to reconcile their “helping, thera-
peutic, or problem-solving role” with their “legalistic, or sur-
veillance, role.”47 There are divided opinions about the extent
to which judges should embrace each role.  Some judges who
administer treatment courts assume explicitly that it is appro-
priate for judges to assume a “therapeutic relationship” with the
defendant because the goals and values of such courts are explic-
itly therapeutic.48 Others argue that this may create boundary
issues if the judge later has to impose sanctions or that seeking
to create this type of relationship with a defendant is at odds
with the nature of judging.49
The probation literature (if not agencies) appears to assume
that both therapeutic and legalistic roles are an inescapable
aspect of supervision, and that reconciling them is both the most
difficult and most important
component of effective proba-
tion work.50 In fact, accord-
ing to Carl Klockar’s theory of
probation supervision, effec-
tive officers synthesize treat-
ment and control by making
it clear to probationers over
time that officers must abide
by departmental rules, but
want the probationer to suc-
ceed and will offer him or her
every reasonable aid to do so.  The legalistic, surveillance ele-
ment of the officer’s role is transferred to the (largely fictional)
oversight powers of the department, allowing a second critical
tool for securing compliance, i.e., rapport between the officer
and probationer, to remain intact:
I tell my probationers that I’m here to help them, to
get them a job, and whatever else I can do.  But I tell
them too that I have a job to do and a family to support
and that if they get too far off the track, I can’t afford to
put my job on the line for them.  I’m going to have to vio-
late them.51
The dual nature of the relationship between probation officer
and probationer, or between court and defendant, is made even
more complex by the expectations of other parties that may be
involved in the client’s treatment.  This is true particularly of
treatment agencies that may wish to use the court or probation
officer to exert leverage on the client to comply with treatment.
Treatment providers may value coercive strategies for clients
who are acutely ill or do not adhere to treatment.52 The thera-
peutic relationship between treatment provider and client may,
however, be compromised if the provider issues threats or
applies sanctions for noncompliance with mandated treatment.
In such circumstances, it may be in the interest of both the
provider and client to rely on the power of the probation officer
or court to impose sanctions, holding the provider out of the
fray.  Transferring the controlling aspect of these relationships to
the probation department may preserve the provider’s therapeu-
tic alliance with the client, and the therapeutic alliance has been
shown to strongly influence treatment outcomes.53
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Second, like specialty agen-
cies, problem-solving courts
must address the appropriate-
ness of applying sanctions,
including incarceration for
noncompliance.  Drug courts
are based explicitly on the use
of a “carrot and stick” approach
in which the offer of treatment
is conditioned by the threat of
punishment if the defendant
does not comply with treat-
ment.54 There is also evidence
that the threat of sanctions by
the court may increase defendant compliance with drug treat-
ment.55 Mental health courts were initially more ambivalent
about the use of punishment, though this ambivalence may be
eroded as mental health courts increasingly assume jurisdiction
over felonies.56 What is clear is that we do not yet know the
comparative impact of sanctions, inducements, or a mixture of
the two on client compliance with treatment. There is anecdotal
evidence on all sides of the question, but until more definitive
research is done, the adoption of one or another strategy regard-
ing the use of sanctions will be guided as much by intuition and
philosophy as empiricism.
Given parallels between specialty probation agencies and
problem-solving courts in their basic goals and approaches, it is
not surprising that the two are sometimes linked developmen-
tally.  For example, in our national survey of the use of specialty
probation, 15% of specialty supervisors described being affili-
ated with a mental health court.57 In Maricopa County, Arizona,
the mental health court was created years after specialty mental
health probation was established.  As another example, in
Broward County, Florida, a felony mental health court was cre-
ated after the adoption of mental health probation, in part so
that specialty officers would only have to deal with one judge
rather than several judges and in part so that a uniform philos-
ophy would govern the use of mental health probation in the
county.58 In other instances (e.g., Seattle), specialty probation
officers were hired and trained specifically to work with referrals
from the mental health court.
Although the implications of these linkages are not yet clear,
logic and anecdotal evidence suggest that there may be both
advantages and disadvantages.  Specialty probation officers who
work with a mental heath court might enjoy the affiliation for its
air of authority; familiar, team-based approach to ongoing prob-
lem-solving; and relatively predictable decisions.  As court and
probation personnel became more familiar with one another and
with their shared caseloads, decision making may become more
efficient.  On the other hand, specialty officers may view the
mental health court as a time-consuming process that increases
the risk that PMIs will be sanctioned.  Because status hearings
are a form of monitoring, their use may detect more violations.
If more violations are detected and specialty officers’ discretion
to apply problem-solving strategies and graduated approaches is
reduced, sanctions may become more likely with the linkage.
Further research undoubtedly will reveal more about the rela-
tionship between specialty probation and mental health courts. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF SPECIALTY MENTAL HEALTH 
CASELOADS
As noted earlier, specialty probation for those with mental ill-
nesses first emerged 25 years ago, with accelerating use in the
last 5 years.  Although it is unclear whether specialty probation
will become a permanent part of the legal landscape, the average
age of specialty probation agencies (approximately 10 years)
suggests that they have some “staying power.” Moreover, cer-
tainly there is little evidence that the prevalence of mental ill-
nesses among criminal defendants will abate in the near future,
or that the trend toward specialization within the legal system to
meet those needs has run its course.   
As jurisdictions consider developing mental health agencies,
four issues in addition to those already discussed will need to be
considered.  First, if specialty probation agencies have a “neces-
sary ingredient,” that ingredient is probably structural, having to
do with the size of the caseload. Available data suggest that vir-
tually all probation supervisors, traditional and specialty alike,
believe that a reduction in mental health caseloads with spe-
cialty officers is useful for supervising PMIs.59 In fact, the abil-
ity of specialty agencies to succeed may well depend upon the
department’s ability to maintain small, specialized caseloads
handled by specially trained probation officers.  In the national
survey, the vast majority of traditional and specialty supervisors
viewed reduced mental health caseloads as “very” useful, but the
majority (56%) of traditional supervisors perceived reduced
caseloads as “not at all” practical in their department.  Similarly,
some specialty agencies were being pushed toward larger case-
loads.  Although the majority (61%) of specialty supervisors per-
ceived reduced caseloads as “very” practical, officers in nearly
one-quarter (23%) of specialty agencies were carrying higher
caseloads than those set forth in their policies.  As explained ear-
lier, larger caseloads necessarily limit officers’ resources for
supervising and meeting the needs of high-risk PMIs.  Notably,
specialty agencies with larger caseloads shared relatively few fea-
tures with the prototypic specialty agency.  For example, large
caseload specialty agencies are significantly less likely than other
specialty agencies to use problem-solving approaches to address
probationer noncompliance.60
The overall volume of probation cases means that vigilance
will be required to maintain reduced mental health caseloads.
For example, in Broward County, Florida, an initial agreement to
limit caseloads for five officers who volunteered and were
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trained to handle mental health cases was abandoned because
the state Department of Corrections insisted that caseload ratios
for probation officers be maintained at the level required for
DOC funding. As a result, caseloads are now larger, mixed
between mental health and general cases, and dispersed among
twelve officers who volunteered or were “drafted.”  It may be that
legislative recognition of a special category of mental health pro-
bation is necessary in some jurisdictions to assure that reduced
caseload size and specialization can be maintained.  Indeed,
some states have created line items in their budgets for supervis-
ing PMIs and parolees with mental illness in the community.61
Second, probation has long been a “practitioner-led”62 enter-
prise where the organizational culture of an agency and charac-
teristics of individual officers strongly influence daily practice.
Thus, there is today little uniformity in training offered to either
traditional or mental health probation officers on topics associ-
ated with mental illnesses. Yet such training is essential, on a
wide variety of topics, including signs and symptoms of mental
illness; medications and their effects and side-effects; and creat-
ing and maintaining a relationship with an individual with a
mental illness.  Similarly, articulated philosophies or standards of
practice for supervising PMIs would be helpful.  Federal hand-
books63 and large, well-developed specialty agencies in the
nation (e.g., Maricopa County, Arizona, Cook County, Illinois)
provide examples of philosophies, policies, and training pro-
grams that could serve as models.
Third, the issue of confidentiality is a significant one that has
become even more complicated with the adoption of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regula-
tions on protecting the privacy of individual health informa-
tion.64 There are provisions of HIPAA that permit the use and
disclosure of protected health information as “required by law”
including by court order.65 In addition, conditions of probation
may be written to require that the probationer consent to the dis-
closure of medical and mental health records.  Given that the
number of parties involved in specialty probation may include
the court, the probation officer, and multiple treatment and
social services agencies, however, it will likely become necessary
in most jurisdictions to create formal agreements between the
various parties, consistent with HIPAA and applicable state law,
to govern the exchange of information.  Alternatively, in the pro-
totypic specialty agency, the probation officer often becomes part
of the treatment team, such that as a practical matter “confiden-
tiality ceases to exist.”66
Finally, the recent explosion of mental health courts may facil-
itate the growth of specialty probation agencies in many juris-
dictions, just as the creation of specialty agencies has prompted
some jurisdictions to move toward problem-solving courts. As
the opportunities to join these problem-solving agencies arise,
communities must strive to maximize the administrative effi-
ciencies and unique therapeutic potential of both systems while
avoiding the possibility of merely increasing surveillance of pro-
bationers.  Achieving increased monitoring in the absence of
increased treatment access may do little to address the serious
treatment and social service needs of PMIs.  
The unprecedented volume of individuals with mental ill-
nesses and substance use disorders in the criminal justice system
has resulted in sweeping philosophic and operational changes
throughout that system. Specialty mental health probation is a
clear example of the continuing struggle to integrate concerns
with public safety and a more therapeutic approach to the needs
of defendants with serious mental illnesses. 
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